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Health status during the working life plays a major role in the retirement decision. Significant 
links between professional paths, retirement age and retirement conditions (disability pension, 
inability pension, reduced-rate pension, or full rate by age) can be highlighted by logistic 
models regressions and a typology of the professional careers of the 1940-generation of the 
French Social Security insured, whose the insurance period is insufficient to fulfill the full-
rate pension criterion.  
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Introduction 
In France, the most recent reform of the public and private sectors’ pension schemes took 
place in 2003. The main measure was an increase in the contribution period to 41 years in 
2012 (increasing to 42 years in 2020), and an alignment of the contribution period of civil 
servants with that of private sector workers (40 years in 2008). In this context, questions of 
health and in particular hard working conditions became part of the related  public debate. 
The current French pay-as-you-go system partially recognises health problems. The special 
schemes, which cover the employees of a few public sector and major national companies 
(national railways, the Paris public transportation system, electricity supply , and so on), take 
into account the difficulty of the working conditionsby allowing early retirement before 60. 
The  Social  Security  pension  scheme  (the  basic  scheme),  which  covers  all  private-sector 
employees, takes health problems into account, but to a smaller extent. Firstly, periods of 
sickness and disability periods are included with periods of employment when calculating the 
pension. Secondly, at the end of one’s working life, unfit or disabled insured workers get a 
full pension from the age of 60 (cf. Box 1). Furthermore, in 2003, the reform reduced by half 
the penalty applied to the pension in the case of early retirement prior to obtaining the full-
rate.This measure alleviates the financial pressures on the retirement decision for healthy, 
insured workers who would not qualify for disablement or disability pensions. 
These measures consider health problems occurring during a professional career and their 
consequences. But are they sufficient to compensate for the shortening of the employment and 
retirement durations engendered by one’s limited physical activities? The coming  generations 
of  retirees  will  have  had  less  “orderly”  careers  than  their  predecessors,  with  more 
unemployment  and  non-working  spells,  so  that  the  proportion  of  persons  with  a  reduced 
pension  will  increase.  One  may  therefore  ask  if,  the  criteria  for  disablement  recognition 
correctly identify those who are unable to continue working. Is the softening of the retirement 3 
conditions well-defined for identifying this unhealthy population? The accuracy of the penalty 
reduction has  yet to be assessed and it seems necessary to identify the individual factors 
determining the conditions and the choices at the end of one’s working life. 
 
Following our previous works (Briard, 2006; Barnay, 2005), this contribution focuses on the 
insured who retired with an insufficient insurance period to reach the full-rate (157 quarters 
for  insured  workers  born  in  1940).  We  use  the  Social  Security  pension  scheme  database 
which records all the events of a private sector worker’s professional career: their wages, 
unemployment  spells,  sickleaves,  periods  of  disability,  etc.  Poor  health  is  identified 
throughout the career by both sick and disability leaves of absence, and at the end of working-
life by the granting of disablement or disability pension benefits. 
Here,  we  consider  two  possible  scenarios  influencing  the  retirement  timing.  In  the  first 
scenario, an administrative decision declares the worker unfit or disabled, which allows a full-
rate retirement of the employee from the age of 60, without any decision being made by the 
worker.  In  the  second  scenario,  beyond  the  age  of  60,  for  employees  who  have  not  yet 
claimed their pension rights, there is the choice between a reduced rate pension before 65 and 
a full pension at 65; in that case, the worker has to carry out a work/leisure trade-off and he is 
an actor in his decision. 
To assess the degree of constraint on the retirement timing, particularly when one’s health has 
suffered, we attempt to relate the retirement modes and the various events which constitute 
the career (episodes of wage-earning, unemployment, not working, sickleave, etc.).  
After a brief survey of the empirical literature on the links between health and work statuses, 
we analyse the links between careers and retirement conditions for retirees born in 1940, 
distinguishing between those receiving a normal pension (reduced rate or full-rate according 
to the age) and those declared unfit or disabled.  4 
Our analysis proceeds in two main steps. First, a descriptive approach based on a typological 
analysis characterises a reduced number of representative careers. Next, logistic models help 
to explain the retirement conditions from the characteristics of the career, particularly those 
resulting from bad health.  
 
Box 1: Retirement conditions in the French Social Security pension scheme  
For this study, four retirement conditions for  pension rights are distinguished:  
- the disablement pension: the insured is declared unfit for work; the pension is calculated at 
the full-rate, whatever age and  insurance period; 
- the disability pension: at 60, unless the insured person works in a profession and wishes to 
continue, the pension is calculated at the full rate; 
- the reduced rate pension: the insured claims his pension rights before the age of 65 but does 
not have a sufficient insurance period (157 quarters for the 1940 generation); 
- the full-rate pension according to age: the insured claims his pension rights at the age of at 
least 65, his pension is then calculated at the full-rate, independently of his insurance period. 
The other retirement conditions are not considered in this paper for two reasons: they only 
concern insured workers with a long insurance period (the case of the normal pension with the 
full-rate before 65); or they are granted to specific populations (war veterans, deportee, etc.). 
 
 
Brief overview of literature 
How can one measure health status? 
The  definition  and  measurement  of  health  status  can  be  problematic.  Most  recent 
studies  use  subjective  health  measurements  based  on  self-reported  surveys  assessments 
(Campolieti,  2002).  However,  these  measurements  suffer  from  significant  skews:  self-
reported  biases  (sociocultural  notably;  Etilé  and  Milcent,  2006),  endogeneity  biases  (the 
health  status  itself  can  distort  the  quality  of  the  answer;  Bound,  1991),  and  comparisons 
between  individuals  are  delicate  due  to  their  different  value  systems.  Moreover,  the 
justification’s assumption, whereby an individual overrates his poor health status to justify a 
non-working situation.  5 
Such limitations are absent in objective health measurements such as the morbidity diagnosed 
by  general  practitioners.  Also,  the  granting  of  daily  sickleave  benefits,  disability  pension 
benefits or disablement results from a medical protocol. Disability benefits are granted after 
an examination by the Social Security practitioner and paid to disabled insured workers under 
60 years old for a non-professional reason, and for whom the ability to work or their earnings 
is  reduced  by  at  least  two  thirds;  from  the  age  of  60,  the  old  age  pension  takes  over. 
Disablement pensions are granted bythe Occupational Health Physician (OHP), who  assesses 
the  compatibility  of  the  job  with  the  employee’s  health  status.  But  some  biases  remain, 
because the OHPs can be inclined to delay their disablement decision if it leads to a dismissal, 
for example when reclassification is impossible. 
 
 
Health, work and retirement 
The determinants of the retirement decision are often only studied through a financial prism 
(Gruber and Wise, 2004) and few works are interested in early retirement, before the full rate 
is reached (Doerpinghaus and Feldman, 2001). However, a vast empirical literature highlights 
a healthy worker effect  on labour participation. Health problems affect one’s whole career. In 
particular, a poor health status results in early departure from the labour market (Barnay, 2005; 
Blanchet and Debrand, 2008; Lindeboom, 2006; Tessier and Wolff, 2005; Currie and Madrian, 
1999) and less healthy workers wish to leave the labour market earlier (Rapoport, 2006). 
The choice of retirement age can be modeled as a decision of labour supply and the result of a 
trade-off between leisure and work, and probably  also between level of health status and 
financial  constraints.  But  in  fact,  claiming  a  pension  is  not  always  concomitant  with 
withdrawal from the labour market, because two thirds of employees are no longer employed 
when they retire. In any case, there are many ways of permanently leaving the labour market . 6 
Hence, the impact of health status on retirement behaviour has to be considered in the light of  
the various modes of withdrawal, such as the Job Seeking Exemption (until July 2008) or 
early retirements. The disablement and disability pensions are reserved for the unhealthiest 
people, but some unhealthy workers also  stop their professional activity prematurely due  to 




Testing the assumption of a healthy worker effecton the labour market requires a chronology 
of  the  disease  and  employment  episodes  along  the  professional  paths.  To  look  for  the 
determinants  of  retirement,  we  therefore  study  the  whole  career  and  proceed  with  two 
successive  steps:  a  classification  analysis  of  professional  careeers  in  order  to  define  a 
typology, followed by an estimation using logistic models to understand the determinants of 
the retirement modes. 
In  the  first  step,  the  typological  analysis  allows  us  to  summarise  the  heterogeneous 
professional careers of private sector workers, which show complex configurations, with a 
mixture of periods of activity and different kinds of non-working statuses (unemployment, 
sickleave, disability, or without an identified reason; cf. Box 2). It captures the resemblances 
and the disparities of professional careers by taking them globally, without any theoretical 
assumptions (Bry and Antoine, 2004; Fénelon et al., 2000). 
The classification analysis is carried out using  Social Security  pension scheme individual 
records for the 1935-1940 generation. For the study, we only retain those pensioners alive on 
December 31
st, 2005, born in 1940, and having an insufficient insurance period to reach the 
full-rate (157 quarters).  7 
The individual accounts are managed by the National old-age pension fund (Cnav). They 
include all the necessary data for the calculation of the pension: annual contributory wages 
(under the earnings-ceiling), periods of unemployment, of illness, maternity or occupational 
injury, and periods of disability benefits. This administrative database does not suffer from 
self-reported biases like self-reported data. To avoid endogeneity and measurement skews, 
studies  use  different  health  measures.  Using  an  administrative  health  measurement, 
endogeneity  could  result  from  the  professional  conditions  of  benefit  allocation  or  the  job 
conditions. However, its main disadvantage is that it mentions interruptions in a career only if 
they  allowed  the  validation  of  an  “assimilated  period”  (AP),  i.e.  a  quarter  considered 
equivalent to a quarter of insurance. In particular, periods of illness are only mentioned if the 
insured worker was contributing to  the Social Security pension scheme during his sickleave, 
which  lasted at least 60 days.  
 
Box 2: Coding and Classification analysis methodology 
The  classification  analysis  follows  the  methodology  presented  in  Briard  (2006),  but  it 
differs over the definition of the wage classes and in the addition of illustrative variables. It is 
performed on those insured by the Social Security pension scheme and born between 1935 
and 1940. The method can be summarised in five points: 
1. The method is derived from textual statistics (Guerin-Pace, 1998) used for the study of 
itineraries,  as  used  in  numerous  works  published  by  Cereq
3 researchers.  It  is  particularly 
designed to better catch the time variable than methods such as the optimal matching analysis 
(OMA). 
The career path between the ages of 15 and 59 is described, year per year, by fourteen 
annual exclusive statuses (en):  
- concerning the contributory periods: e1: annual wage < 2
nd decile of the distribution for 
the insured of the same generation, e2: wage < 4
th decile, e3: wage < median, e4: wage < 6
th 
decile,  e5:  wage  <  8
th  decile,  e6:  wage  <  Social  Security  earnings-ceiling,  e7  ³  earnings-
ceiling,  
-  concerning  the  non-contributory  periods:  e8:  short-term  unemployment  (<  average 
duration  for  the  generation),  e9:  long-term  unemployment;  e10:  sickness,  maternity, 
employment  injury  (disability  <  66%);  e11:  disability;  e12:  national  service;  e13:  quarters 
validated by other pension schemes; e14: non-working or lack of information (expatriate or in 
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the public service).   
To be able to cluster the closest professional paths, while best preserving their evolution, the 
paths  are  described  over  five  year  periods  (15-19,  20-24,  etc.)  using  nine  sequences  of 
fourteen characters, the i
th character indicating the number of times when the i
th status is met. 
The reduction of the number of modalities is necessary to carry out the analysis. So, in an 
iterative way, we recode the modalities expressed by less than 1% of the insured on the basis 
of a more reduced number of statuses (13 then 12 then 11).  
2. At the end of the coding phase, professional careers are described by nine qualitative 
variables and are subjected to a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). Then, the twenty 
main factors of the MCA become the active variables of a mixed classification, which chains 
a non-hierarchical algorithm of the k-means – iterated three times with the selection of the 
stable forms – and a hierarchical ascending classification. 
3. The optimal number of clusters is determined by the three statistical criteria (R² semi-
partial, pseudo T², pseudo F), which give information  about the loss of homogeneity caused 
by the reduction of the number of clusters. 
4. A stratification is then made in order to use the available information in a heterogeneous 
way according to the generations. Basically, we identify the recipients of the Old-age pension 
for parents living at home (OPLH), introduced in 1972, and the insured for whom the pension 
calculation reveals  a salaried activity in the public service or as an expatriate, which are 
rarely registered in the insured’s account before their retirement.  
5. Finaly, to stabilise the final partition, a discriminant analysis is performed, connecting 
the ten clusters previously defined with the descriptive variables of professional careerss (for 
each of nine quinquennial periods, fourteen variables counting the expression of a state in the 
initial list). 
 
The classification analysis identifies ten clusters of strongly differentiated professional careers 
(cf. Box 3). It appears that some insured workers have to cope with health problems; some of 
them interrupt their professional careers and\or are granted a disablement or disability pension, 
while others meet health and financial difficulties. 
 
Box 3: Ten clusters of professional careers* 
Cluster 1: “Precarious”   
(35.9% of the population; 28.9% men, 71.1% women)   
The careers are split, the wage-earning rate in the private-sector does not exceed 45% and the 
wages are for the most part  lower than the 2
nd decile. 
Cluster 2: “Non-working young”   
(15.2% of the population; 29.2% men, 70.8% women)   
The careers are short, pursued only in the private-sector, and concentrated at the beginning of 
working life: the maximum rate of wage-earners (46%) is reached at the age of 19. 
Cluster 3: “Unstable”   
(13.4% of the population; 47.8% men, 52.2% women)   9 
The careers are precarious and split. In most, two thirds of the insured are employed and the 
second part of the working life is marked by periods of sickness (from 6% to 11% from the 
age  of  45),  of  unemployment  (more  than  10%  from  40,  and  more  than  a  quarter  of  the 
population after 45) or of disability (more than 10% of the population from 54). For more 
than two thirds of the employees, the wages are lower than the median wage. 
Cluster 4: “Self-employed”   
(12.4% of the population; 40.4% men, 59.6% women)   
The careers are long, begun in the private-sector, then pursued in a sector covered by another 
old-age scheme than that of the public service or one abroad. The employment rate exceeds 
90% between 40 and 51 years of age. The wages are very low, mainly lower than the 2
nd 
decile after the age of 40. 
Cluster 5: “Recipients of the Old-age-pension-for-parents-living-at-home”    
(11.1% of the population; 0.4% men, 99.6% women)   
The careers are typically those of mothers with several children and modest incomes: the 
private-sector career is short, with breaks at the birthsof the children, then restarting  around 
35-40 years of age. The insured workers in this cluster benefit from the OPLH for at least 
seven years. Their wages are very low, lower than the 2
nd decile of the wage distribution of 
their generation, which amy be a sign  of part-time or seasonal activities, or temping. 
Cluster 6: “Multipensioned of the public sector and expatriates”    
(5.6% of the population; 72.7% men, 27.3% women)   
The careers are long, pursued for the main part in the public service or as expatriates, for at 
least nineteen years. The private-sector wage-earning rate remains low, always lower than 
40%. The wages are mostly very low, lower than the 2
nd decile after the age of 40. 
Cluster 7: “Late employed”    
(3.0% of the population; 56.6% men, 43.4% women)   
The careers begin relatively late: the private-sector wage-earning rate only reaches 50%  at 
the age of 30, but it exceeds 80% from 38 to 51. Careers are continuous although their ends 
are marked by sickness, disability or unemployment. The wages are mainly lower than the 6
th 
decile and at most nine years are paid over the median wage before the age of 40. 
Cluster 8: “Stable employees with high wages”    
(2.2% of the population; 73.6% men, 26.4% women)   
The careers are relatively continuous and the private-sector wage-earning rate remains higher 
than 50% from the age of 27 to 57. The end of the career is however marked by sickness, 
disability or unemployment. The wages are stable, and mostly superior to the 8
th decile from 
30 years old on, even reaching the earnings-ceiling. 
Cluster 9: “Stable employees with a shortened career”   
(0.6% of the population; 84.6% men, 15.4% women)   
The careers are continuous, the private-sector wage-earning rate exceeds 80% from 25 to 47 
years  of  age,  but  the  end  of  the  working-life  is  marked  by  sickness,  disability  or 
unemployment. At least ten years are paid over the median wage before the age of 40. The 
wages can reach the 8
th decile from the age of 30, but they stay below the earnings-ceiling. 
Cluster 10: “Disabled young”    
(0.5% of the population; 57.6% men, 42.4% women)   
The private-sector career is prematurely interrupted by periods of sickness (from 25 to 40 
years, at least 10% of the workforce of the cluster are concerned). More half of the insured of 
the cluster are recognised as having a disability after the age of 35 years, and more than 85% 
after 50 years. 10 
 
* By decreasing number of insured. 
 
These disparities of career paths result in differences in retirement behaviours and retirement 
conditions (cf. Table 1). A third of employees with an incomplete career wait until 65 to claim 
their pension rights, 39% retire at 60 because of disablement or disability (respectively 34% 
and 5%), while 27% claim their rights between 60 and 64 and get a reduced-rate pension. The 
retirement conditions are strongly gender differentiated. Women retire at 65 (or beyond) more 
frequently than men (41% vs. 21%), more often at 60 with a disablement pension (35% vs. 
32%)  and  less  often  retire  with  a  reduced  rate  (19.6%  vs.  40.2%).  These  differences  are 
particularly high in the clusters 2, 6, and 9 in which the full-rate is acquired by the age (at 65), 
four or six times more often for women than for men. Other clusters are characterised by early 
retirements because of health problems: 45% of the insured in cluster 5, “housewives with 
low  wages”,  and  38%  of  the  insured  in  cluster 2,  “non-working  young”,  benefit  from  a 
disablement pension. Finally, retirement with a disability pension concerns 90% of  cluster 10, 
the “disabled young”, and 21% of cluster 3, the “unstable”. 
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Table 1. Retirement conditions by cluster and by sex (in %) 
 
Clusters  Disablement  Disability  Reduced rate  Full rate  
by age  Total 
1: Precarious  33.9  2.7  24.1  39.3  35,9 
2: Non-working young   37.8  0.0  31.9  30.4  15,2 
3: Unstable  31.6  21.2  12.6  34.7  13,4 
4: Self-employed  33.3  0.1  28.8  37.8  12,4 
5: Recipients of OPLH  44.9  1.4  21.1  32.6  11,1 
6: Multipensioned of the public 
sector and expatriates  22.7  0.6  70.7  6.0  5,6 
7: Late employed  27.0  13.2  17.5  42.3  3,0 
8: Stable, high wages  15.7  6.4  38.6  39.3  2,2 
9: Stable, shortened career  23.1  15.4  43.6  17.9  0,6 
10: Disabled young  12.1  87.9  0.0  0.0  0,5 
Total  33.9  5.1  26.7  34.3  100,0 
 
Disablement  Disability  Reduced rate  Full rate  
by age  Clusters 
M  W  M  W  M  W  M  W 
Total 
1: Precarious  32.9  34.3  1.9  3.0  48.5  14.2  16.7  48.5  35,9
2: Non-working young   36.5  38.3  0.0  0.0  57.0  21.5  6.5  40.2  15,2
3: Unstable  32.8  30.5  22.8  19.7  9.8  15.1  34.8  34.6  13,4
4: Self-employed  38.0  30.1  0.3  0.0  30.4  27.7  31.3  42.2  12,4
5: Recipients of OPLH  66.7  44.8  0.0  1.5  0.0  21.2  33.3  32.6  11,1
6: Multipensioned of the public 
sector and expatriates  19.5  31.3  0.8  0.0  76.6  55.2  3.1  13.5  5,6
7: Late employed  29.9  23.2  15.9  9.8  8.4  29.3  45.8  37.8  3,0
8: Stable, high wages  18.4  8.1  5.8  8.1  40.8  32.4  35.0  51.4  2,2
9: Stable, shortened career  27.3  0.0  18.2  0.0  42.4  50.0  12.1  50.0  0,6
10: Disabled young  15.8  7.1  84.2  92.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0,5
Total  31.5  35.2  7.0  4.1  40.2  19.6  21.4  41.1  100,0
 
 
Source: CNAV, 1940 generation, those insured by the Social Security pension scheme with an incomplete career. 
Read note: 32.9% of ‘precarious men’ claimed a disablement pension.  
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What is the impact of interruptions for health reasons on retirement conditions? 
 
Most  studies  which  use  an  individual  chronological  data  analysis  followed  by  an 
econometrical  analysis,  aim  to  study  the  individual  determinants  of  the  trajectories  (e.g. 
McVicar  and  Anyadike-Danes,  2002).  Our  approach  is  different,  in  the  sense  that  the 
professional path is not the dependent variable, but one of the explanatory variables of the 
retirement conditions. The professional careers are taken as a whole with all their complexity 
by the classification analysis.  Belonging to a cluster is a “composite” variable of “simple” 
variables  such  as  the  individual  features  (sex,  marital  situation,  country  of  residence);the 
explanatory elements of the retirement conditions will be sought among these variables.  
By their nature, the retirement conditions are linked to age criteria (cf. Table 2). We observe 
that 80% of the recipients of a disablement pension and the totality of the recipients of a 
disability pension liquidate their pension rights at 60, and 83% of the insured claim their 
pension rights for a reduced rate at the same age. 
 
Table 2. Conditions and age of retirement 
Age  Disablement  Disability  Reduced rate  Full rate by 
age  Total 
60  79.7%  100%  82.9%  -  54.3% 
61  8.1%  -  7.4%  -  4.7% 
62  5.4%  -  6.1%  -  3.4% 
63  4.7%  -  2.6%  -  2.3% 
64  2.1%  -  1.0%  -  1.0% 
65  0.1%  -  -  100%  34.3% 
N  2,116  319  1,669  2,139  6,243 
%  34%  5%  27%  34%  100% 
 
Source: CNAV, 1940 generation, those insured by the Social security pension scheme with an incomplete career. 
 
 
Further, the age and the retirement conditions depend heavily upon the careers. On average, 
employees retire  at 61.9  year of  age  (cf. Table  1 and Table 4A). As expected, “disabled 13 
young” (Cluster 10)  claim their pension rights at 60. On the other hand, precarious, self-
employed workers, late employees and stable ones with high wages (Clusters 1, 4, 7 and 8) 
claim their pension rights at least two years later than the disabled young. 
 
Table 3: Average age of retirement, by cluster 
 
  Age 
  N  mean  std-dev. 
1: Precarious  2,240  62.2  2.36 
2: Non-working young  948  61.7  2.25 
3: Unstable  836  61.9  2.34 
4: Self-employees  775  62.2  2.34 
5: Recipients of OPLH  691  61.9  2.30 
6: Multipensioned of the public sector and 
expatriates  352  60.5  1.29 
7: Late employed  189  62.4  2.37 
8: Stable with high wages  140  62.2  2.34 
9: Stable with shortened career  39  61.0  1.93 
10: Disabled young  33  60.0  0 
Total  6,243  61.9  2.32 
 
 
To  better  explain  the  retirement  conditions,  we  perform  logistic  regressions.  We 
consider explanatory variables such as sex, marital status, country of residence at retirement, 
and  descriptors  of  the  professional  path  such  as  the  number  of  years  with  a  salaried 
occupation,  with  AP-disability,  AP-sickness,  and  AP-unemployment  (cf.  Table  4A).  We 
exclude the variable “number of years of non-working” (except unemployment, sickness or 
disability) for obvious reasons of multicollinearity. 
As we have already noted, information about health status is captured both during the 
working life by AP-illness and AP-disability and at retirement by the granting of disablement 
or  disability  pensions.  However,  the  explanatory  power  of  the  variable  “number  of  AP-
illnesses” is limited for the female population, because it includes maternity leaves (a quarter 14 
is validated for the leave for a childbirth if the mother was insured at the time by the Social 
Security pension scheme).  
 
At  60  years  of  age,  insured  workers  with  incomplete  career  paths  can  go  through  two 
successive episodes.  
-  The first episode concerns the insured who suffer from serious health problems. It leads to 
being unfit to work and/or a retirement at the earliest possible time, before 65. If the 
workers are declared unfit for work or disabled, they benefit from a full rate pension from 
60.  
-  The second episode concerns the insured whose health status is relatively unchanged. 
They have to choose between claiming their rights for a reduced rate pension or waiting 
until the age of 65 to benefit from a full one. Other criteria than health status intervene in 
this choice, such as financial means or the standard factors of the labour supply such as 
the marital status (Sédillot and Walraët, 2002 ; Coile, 2005).  
Both  episodes  can  be  analysed  with  two  logistic  regressions  to  understand  the  impact  of  
health  status  on  the  retirement  conditions,  summarised  in  three  modalities:  retirement  for 
reasons of disablement or disability, retirement at a reduced rate, and retirement at the full-
rate according to  age. 
Table 4A  
  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Min  Max 
Retirement age  61.94  2.32  60  65 
Number of years with AP-disability  0.39  2.15  0  34 
Number of years with AP-sickness  1.08  1.71  0  14 
Number of years with AP-unemployment  1.41  2.85  0  22 
Number of years with a salaried occupation  22.36  37.98  0  146 




  N  % 
Sex (y = ”men”)  2 158  34.6 % 
Country of residence at retirement (y = ”France”)  5 295  84.8 % 
Marital status (y = ”Married”)  4388  70.3 % 
Source: CNAV, 1940 generation, those insured by the Social security pension scheme with an incomplete career. 
N=6243 
 
Table 5. Estimation for the two episodes (odd-ratios) 
  Episode 1  Episode 2 
 
Unfit or disabled vs  
Reduced rate or full rate by age 
Reduced rate vs  
Full rate by age 
  M  W  Total  M  W  Total 
Sex (ref: men)             
women              
 
    0.69*** 






































































Marital status (ref: others)             
















Country of residence at 
retirement (ref: others)             














N  2 158  4 085  6 243  1 328  2 480  3 808 
N (yi=1)  830  1605  2435  867  802  1 669 
Quality of the model             














* 5%, ** 0.1% et *** 0.001%; NS: not significant (Standard-errors) 
Source: CNAV, 1940 generation, those insured by the Social security pension scheme with an incomplete career. 
 
AP =  “assimilated period”:  one quarter of insurance  validated for one quarter of disability,  for 60 days of 
sickness leave, or 50 days of unemployment. 
 
The first episode concerns the whole population and explains the probability of benefiting from disability or 
disablement pensions from 60 years old(N=6 243). 
The second episode only applies to individuals who are going to end their professional activity with a reduced or 
full-rate pension (N=3 808). 
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In episode 1, in the case of a very bad health status, we cannot refer to the standard 
framework of the labour supply. Instead, we can suppose that the “preference for leisure” is 
high  and  that  the  withdrawal  from  the  labour  market  is  imposed.  This  hypothesis  seems 
confirmed for the male population, as the number of years with a salaried occupation which 
can approximate the individual incomes in this first stage has no impact on the decision. 
The more a career is marked by periods of disability, the greater the probability of benefiting 
from disability or disablement: for men, it is 2.3 times greater, other things being equal. For 
women, the correlation is so strong (99% of  women with an AP-disability receive a disability 
or  disablement  pension)  that  the  associated  odd-ratio  is  superior  to  14.  There  is  thusa 
threshold effect in the gravity of the health status, beyond which the agent no longer arbitrates 
in their retirement decision. 
If the health status does not justify the granting of these kinds of benefits, the employee has to 
make  a  choice  under  constraint,  withoutthe  social  coverage  from  which  he  could  benefit 
during the first episode. Having been disabled has no impact on the probability of claiming a  
pension at a reduced rate rather than at the one. The healthy worker effect from this proxy 
thus seems determinant for early retirement during the first episode at 60. Disability affects 
the  unhealthiest  workers  and  in  fact    this  health  status’s  indicator  strongly  selects  the 
individuals, particularly  women. During the first episode, the predominance of the health 
motive could also explain the eviction of the periods of unemployment by the periods of 
disablement or disability as relevant explanatory variables. Unemployment is barely or not at 
allsignificant there, but it intervenes during the second episode by influencing a retirement 
decision at 65. Doubtless, two categories of workers are concerned: on the one hand, healthy 
insured workers who have been through periods of unemployment and who are encouraged to 
work longer, and on the other hand, insured workers who are unemployed at the end of their 17 
working lives and are exempted from seeking employment as long as they cannot reach the 
full rate.  
Living  in  France  multiplies  by  about  3.5  the  probability  of  claiming  a  disablement  or 
disability  pension,  which  may  be  because  unhealthy  workers  have  little  inclination  to 
emigrate, particularly when they are about to request their pension rights from the French 
pension scheme. Furthermore, those living abroad at the end of their working life sometimes 
have no way to bring attention to their poor health. This hypothesis could explain their greater 
inclination to retire early to get the full rate. However, the gap remains small and other factors 
must  be  considered:  the  access  to  information,  the  continuation  of  a  professional  activity 
abroad not recognised by the French Social Security pension scheme, the difference of health 
level, and so on. 
The marital situation seems to play a protective role on the labour market for men: being 
married decreases their probability ofclaiming a disablement or disability pension by 43%, 
although it does not affect their choice between  retirement at a reduced rate and  retirement at 
65. Conversely, for women, being married only affects the choice of an early retirement at a 
reduced rate.  
Generally, women retire later than men. In 2006, 23% of them claimed their rights for the 
Social Security pension scheme at 65 or older, against only 13% of men. When considering 
retirees  with  an  incomplete  career,  born  in  1940,  these  disparities  between  men’s  and  
women’s  behaviours  still  remain  after  taking  into  account  periods  of  interruption  in  their 
careers, marital status and the country of residence. In particular, if the health status does not 
justify recognition of the disablement or the disability, women retire at 65 (or later) twice as 
frequently as men. This higher inclination of women to claim their pensions at full-rate could 
be explained by a life expectancy effect: they incorporate into their retirement behaviour their 
favourable  life  expectancy,    and    the  resultant  risk  of  widowhood  and  need  to  support 18 
themselves
4. Women are likely go on working if they are healthy, but they may also put off  
claiming their rights if their financial situations allow it; savings or their spouses’ incomes are 
then a means to finance the transition between an early withdrawal from the labour force and 
the  first  payment  of  the  pension.  Only  the  health  status  approximated  by  the  number  of 
sickleaves seems able to explain a departure before the age of 65. Additional analyses should 
therefore be performed to determine  which part of this indicator/parameter is connected to 
the health status rather thanmaternity.  
In order to refine the understanding of the choice between the reduced and the full rates, we 
carry out regressions on the three largest clusters: precarious, non-working young and instable. 
 
                                                       
4 Couples take out insurance against this risk: one they may use survivor pensions, although in the private sector, 
these benefits are means tested and their amounts do not exceed 54% of the deceased spouse’s pension, or life 
insurance, but this supposes a saving capacity during  working life. 19 
Table 6. Estimation of the probability of obtaining a reduced rate vs full rate for three Clusters 
(Odd ratios) 
  Episode 2 
 
Reduced rate vs  









Sex (ref: men)       












(0.83)   
#   
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Marital situation (ref : others)       









Country of residence at retirement (ref:others)       








N  1 420  590  395 
N (yi=1)  540  302  105 
Quality of the model       








* 5%, ** 0.1% et *** 0.001%; NS: not significant (Standard-errors) 
# Lack of data  
Source:  CNAV,  1940  generation,  those  insured  by  the  Social  security  pension  with  an  incomplete  career. 
 
AP =  “assimilated period”:  one quarter of insurance  validated for one quarter of disability,  for 60 days of 
sickness leave, or 50 days of unemployment. 
 
 
These regressions confirm the impact of the vagaries of a career path on retirement 
behaviour revealed above (cf. Table 6). They also allow us to underline how different careers 
- here summarised in a typology – lead to different models of retirement behaviour. 
For precarious and unstable, the more unemployment has affected the career, the later the 
retirement, while, for the precarious, having known periods of sickness tends to increase the 
probability of obtaining a full rate by  age pension. A woman who has pursued a “precarious” 20 
career (Cluster 1) or, even more, a “non-working young” career (Cluster 2), tends to postpone 
her retirement in comparison with a man. Most of those in the ‘precarious’ cluster have low 
wages, lower than the 2
nd decile of the wage distribution of the 1940-generation insured at the 
same age. So, after an intermittent and low-paid working life, if the pension is their only 
income, their financial safety is certainly badly insured. Postponing their retirement allows 
them to expect a higher pension. The non-working  young population is likely to be in a 
different situation. Their early withdrawal from the labour force could be explained by the 
existence  of  additional  incomes  (professional  activity  outside  the  private  sector,  spouse’s 
incomes,  capital  returns)  of  which  we  have  no  knowledge.  Like  precarious,  non-working 
young tend to put off their retirement, but once married, they can be less assertive in their 
decision. The joint decision model could then be determinant (for a survey, see Briard 2006). 
This  ambivalence  when  makingdecisions  seems  to  disappear  for  the  insured  with  erratic 
career paths (Cluster 3): being a woman who is marriedis a combination which tends to bring 
forward the retirement date. In the same way that these women would have privileged their 
family lives over their professional lives when they had children (less than a quarter of them 
are active between 25 and 31), they would have been able to make their retirements coincide 
with their spouses’. Nevertheless, in the absence of data on the professional status of the 





This article attempted to understand the retirement behaviour of those insured by the 
Social Security pension scheme, born in 1940 and who claimed their rights without reaching 
the required insurance period for the full rate. By beginning with an exploratory analysis then 21 
moving onto explanatory analyses - a classification analysis based on the CNAV’s individual 
accounts,  followed  by  logistic  regressions  –  we  were  able  to  identify  some  of  the  links 
between  professional career and age of retirement, notably the impact of  health status on 
retirement conditions: departure conforming with the disablement or disability, or the choice 
between a reduced rate pension and a full pension at 65. Careers influence the conditions and 
the age of retirement. Even when we consider homogeneous populations in terms of their 
career path profiles, health is an important factor in retirement planning and health shocks 
tend to increase the propensity to retire earlier. Periods of sickleave and disability, which 
reveal (sometimes  extremely) bad health,  are added to the factors of vulnerability on the 
labour market: unemployment, non-working and low wages. 
We analyzed the retirement conditions through two episodes based on  two different 
lines  of  reasoning.  The  first  is  based  on  the  healthy  worker  effect  and  the  physical 
impossibility of pursuing a professional activity. Retirement conforming with the disablement 
or the disability then depends on a medical examination. These results underline the essential 
role that continued employment and retirement policies play in the number of years spent 
healthy  and  at  work.  In  order  to  decrease  the  number  of  recipients  of  disability  and 
disablement pensions, it should be possible to invest in health at work during the entire career 
so that health shocks are  avoided. Such a  measure would take some pressure off   public 
health insurance finances and the PAYG system in France, and increase the employment rate 
before the age of 60, under favourable labour market conditions. 
Those who do not benefit from these specific conditions of premature departure move into the 
second episode - the choice between a reduced rate pension between 60 and 65 or a full-rate 
from 65. In that case, the decision corresponds more to a classic work / leisure trade-off. 
Household incomes and the marital status can then play an essential role. Women, who often 
have lower incomes than their spouses, as a result seem to be more inclined to delay applying 
for  their pension rights. However, they seem to bring forward their retirement dates when 
they give greater  priority to their family lives. 22 
The professional typology highlights very frail populations, such as the recipients of the Old-
age-pension-for-parents-living-at-home, which is predominantly a population of mothers. It 
seems necessary to maintain, or even better to increase, the Assimilated Period designed to 
compensate women for their children’s education. 
Data on financial resources, the  gravity of the  health status,  working  conditions and the 
nature of jobs would certainly afford other significant elements for studying the determinants 
of the departure at a reduced rate.  This would allow progress on the link between physical 
difficulty of work and age of retirement. This relation is crucial for the correct adjustment of 
the Social Security pension scheme parameters, as workers must not be encouraged to retire 
prematurely and unnecessarily, which would weigh down financial expenses, but must also 
not be prevented from retiring early when justified by their health status. 
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